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A REAPPRAISAL OF THE IMMUNITY
FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION
NATHAN APRIL*

Students of the development of our Constitution cannot fail to
have noted the contrapuntal aspect of that development. The area
of federal power has been expanded far beyond the intent of those
who first charted it; and the domain of those personal immunities
embraced within the Bill of Rights has been counter-stretched in
equal measure to redress the constitutional balance. The Founding
Fathers would undoubtedly have been dismayed to learn that they
had devolved upon Congress the power to fix the maximum number
of hours per week that a factory hand in New York would be
permitted to work; they would be equally mystified over the pronouncement of the Supreme Court that the picketing en masse of a
factory (an action whose only rationale could be that of a demonstration in force) was nothing more than the exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of speech.
It is not our purpose to develop this contrapuntal theme. Note
of the matter is taken here only because it illuminates the dynamics
which shaped the judicial interpretation of the Constitution. The
central government had to be made stronger than the Constitution
had made it if it was to survive; but, just because of that, the bulwarks of our personal liberties had to be hedged with a perimeter of
granite. A Judith Coplon case would have been inconceivable to
the stalwarts of 1788.
That such a granitic fortress might protect treason and other
destructive forces, as well as our freedoms, is a thought which, if
it did at times seep into the consciousness of the learned justices,
seems to have given them little concern. Let us now fix our attention upon what is perhaps the most curious of our personal immunities.
The 5th Amendment to the Constitution proscribes a number
of things, though the gamut of popular discussion about it seems
to indicate a belief that the amendment concerns itself solely with
the matter of immunity from self-incrimination. However, it is
with that phase of it that this article deals. What does it say?
"No person ...

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself."
Now, there is nothing obscure in the language of this proscription. In criminal cases, a man cannot be compelled to be a "witness"
*Member of the bar of New York, California and the the Supreme Court
of the United States.
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against himself. Inferentially, a man may be compelled to be a
witness against himself -in a civil case. That sort of compulsion is
being exercised in our courts every day. What is a "criminal case"?
A "criminal case" is the judcial prosecution of somebody upon a
criminal charge. When is a person a "witness" in any case? When
he is giving evidence in that case.
If the authors of the Bill of Rights meant to ban compulsory
self-incrimination at any time or place, then why didn't they say so?
Surely, if they wanted to provide that "No person shall anywhere
be compelled to answer any question which would tend to incriminate him," it would have been very simple to say just that.
The composition of that sentence calls for no special ability in
draftsmanship. Why then, did these artists of the written word
obfuscate their meaning by a. statement that, in a "criminal case"
a person should not be compelled to be a "witness" against himself? Could it be that they said what they did say because that is
exactly what they meant? Be that as it may, it is clear that what the
5th Amendment literally says, and what the Supreme Court has
said it says, are not the same thing. Here is probably another instance of the functioning of the compensatory balance wheel in the
dynamics of constitutional interpretation.
Is there a legitimate basis for the doctrine of Counselman v.
Hitchcock?' The thesis of this article is that there is not. It is
submitted that the language of the 5th Amendment expresses nothing more than the Founding Fathers' reaction against the use of
judicial torture in the elicitation of evidence in criminal cases.
1. 142 U. S. 547 (1892). The doctrine of this case may be stated as

follows: No person may be compelled anywhere or at any time, to answer
a question put to him before any court or investigation body or official if
he objects to answering such question upon the ground that his answer might
tend to incriminate him. In commenting upon the language of the 5th Amendment, the Court said, "It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional
provision can only be, that a pet-son shall not be compelled to be a witness
against himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It would doubtless
cover such cases; but it is not limited to them. The object was to insure
that a person should not be compelled when acting as a witness in any
investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself
had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is
as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." Id. at 562.
The development of this thesis implicates a challenge to the fundamental
assumption expressed in this quolation. It is not at all "impossible" to believe
that the draftsmen of the 5th Amendment meant exactly what they said; nor
is anything found in the discussion of the Court which even attempts to demonstrate this alleged "impossibility." Moreover the Court does not undertake to
supply any historical justification :for its further assumption that "[t]he object
was to insure that a person should not be compelled when acting as a witness
in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime!'
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Torture, as an instrument of judicial or administrative investigation, was not an invention of the medieval inquisition. It was
known to Europe long before the 13th century. It was practiced in
Athens and in Rhodes in the time of Socrates; and the jurists of
Rome learned to appreciate its irrefragable logic. The Papal and
Episcopal Inquisitions borrowed it from Rome; as did the states
of Europe after the abandonment of such rigorously logical procedures as trial by combat and other forms of ordeal. The chief
purpose of torture in the investigation of criminal and religious
offenses was not to ascertain the facts, but to extract a confession
of guilt from the victim. In an age when witches, homed devils and
sainted apotheoses were authenticated apparitions, it was thought
that the one sure means of establishing the guilt of the accused was
his sworn confession. It mattered not how that confession was procured; for whether it came voluntarily or after the accused had been
broken on the wheel, it was equally veracious. The theory was that
no man would risk the eternal damnation of his soul by a perjured
confession merely to escape mundane torture.
Confessions rarely came voluntarily; in which respect they differed strangely from those currently produced in Moscow and even
in some of our own courts. In France, judicial torture was not
abolished until the Revolution; in Russia, not until 1801; and in
one of the German states, not until 1831.
It is probable that England was the last European country to
adopt the use of judicial torture until its recrudescence under the
Nazi and Communist regimes. In the days of Queen Elizabeth, a
very fine distinction was developed by the common-law judges as
to the legality of its use. They said that torture, as the punishment
of an offense, was not lawful. It would have redounded more to the
honor of English criminal law if it had countenanced the infliction
of torture upon the guilty as the punishment of crime, rather than
upon the accused as a means of extorting confessions. Later on,
English law writers were to say that the criminal law of England
did not "recognize" torture. The only possible conclusion, then,
must be that if the law did not "recognize" torture, it must have
been suffering from a serious case of myopia. The fact happens to
be, that even without such recognition, torture, as a means of extracting evidence from its victims, was consistently applied by the
judicial and criminal authorities in England from the days of the
Plantagenets down to the end of the 17th century.
Edward Coke (1552-1634), that great protagonist of the common law courts, and their doughty champion against Chancery,
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Admiralty, etc., seems to have been the first English judge to lay
it down that no man could be compelled to be his own accuser.
Coke had been successively a member of Parliament, Solicitor
General, Speaker of the House, Attorney General and Chief Justice
of the King's Bench. As judge, he legislated more common law
than ever did Parliament; much of what he declared to be English law became such upon his ipse dixit. A contemporary of Coke,
and one who looms larger in the story of mankind, was the Lord
Chancellor, Sir Francis Bacon. Both were members of the Privy
Council, which kept records of their own proceedings in their
Council Books. These records are by no means complete, but they
will serve our purpose.
In these Council Books are found memoranda of directions issued
to the Lord Lieutenant of the Tower, and to various ministers of
the law, concerning the administration of torture to suspects imprisoned in the Tower. The Tower does not seem to have been a
gaol for the common variety of criminal; it appears that one had
to be socially acceptable to find lodgment there. It may be supposed
that it was for this reason that the application of torture in this
exclusive institution was controlled by the Privy Council, whose
members probably would have thought it an impertinence to have
their attention drawn to the case of a man, accused, let us say, of the
capital offense of killing a hare in the royal park.
A record dated February 19, 1619-20 (the uncertainty of the
year is very curious), is a letter written by the Privy Council and
signed, among others, by Edward Coke and Francis Bacon; it was
directed to the Lord Lieutenant of the Tower, the Lord Chief
Justice and the Solicitor General, directing them to apply torture
to a certain Mr. Peacock who was sojourning in the Tower upon
a charge of "vehement suspicion of high treason against his majesties sacred person." To quote:
"This shall likewise authorize you or any two of you, whereof
yourself shall be one, to examine the said Peacock from time to
time and put him as there shall be cause for the better manifestation of the truth, to the torture of the manacles or racke. For
which this shall be your waxrant."
By a statute enacted in 1555, it was provided that any person
arrested upon suspicion of felony should be brought before two
justices of the peace acting as committing magistrates and questioned by them, the questions and answers to be used as evidence
at the trial. Torture was applied in these investigations. Up to the
middle of the 17th century, the legality of the use of torture by
these committing magistrates was not challenged.
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An eminent English barrister, Jardine, has collected the text of
over fifty of these Privy Council warrants in his book entitled Use
of Torture in the Criminal Law of England. What distinguishes
the one above quoted from most of the others is the fact that it was
signed by the man who, years before that, had fabricated and given
currency to the alleged maxim "Nerno tenetur seipsum prodere."
When Coke was officiating as a judge on the King's Bench, he
laid it down, when treating of the immunities of the members of the
English nobility, as a "privilege which the law gives for the honor
and reverence of the nobility, that their bodies are not subject to
torture in causa criminis laesae majestatis." And Bacon, in his
treatise entitled Pacificationof the Church, held that torture, in the
judicial procedure of England, was applied "for examination and
not for evidence"; a distinction whose falsity is saved only by its
fatuity.
Torture then, was a means lawfully used to educe a "better
manifestation of the truth"; the greatest English lawyers of the
early 17th century have said so. And while they were saying this,
they were also beginning to say that in England no man could be
compelled to be his own accuser. Can there be any doubt as to which
of these wholly contradictory declarations expressed the truth?
Now it happened that before he ascended the bench, Coke had
been retained as the attorney for a man who had been haled before
the Court of High Commission which had instituted an inquiry as
to his theological orthodoxy. The procedure of this court was
modelled upon that of the Episcopal Inquisition. The arrested
suspect was put under the "oath ex officio" and then was examined
ad lib as to his religious beliefs and practices. Answers deemed to
be incorrect were rectified under the educative influences of the
rack. Coke's client was apparently averse to the prevailing routine;
and so Coke petitioned the judges of the King's Bench in his behalf for a Writ of Prohibition to bar the Court of High Commission
from taking any further steps in the matter. In support of that
petition, Coke cited as a "maxim" of law this Latin concoction:
"nemo tenetur sepsum prodere" (no man is bound to accuse himself). He argued that, since a man was not bound to betray himself,
the Court of High Commission should not be permitted to compel
him to do it.
Just where Coke dug up this "maxim" is not known. Up to
that moment, it had been unknown to the common law of England.
It was not derived from the Civil law; nor can it be traced to the
Canonical law. It happened that about that time, and at the solici-
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tation of the Court of High Commission, an advisory opinion had
been handed down by "Nine Doctors learned in the Civil Law" in
support of the legality of their inquisitional procedure, in which
opinion this "nerno tenetur seipsum prodere" phrase formed part
of a sentence. The whole import of this expression was that although no one is bound to 5etray himself, yet, if common report
2
accuses him of an offense, he should come forward to clear himself.
Now it may be that Coke lifted this "nemo tenetur" business from
the text of the worthy Doctors; and it could be, that he manufactured it himself; in either case, it was a novelty in his time.
The dogma that no one is bound to accuse himself seems to
have glided more or less surreptitiously into the English corpus
juris. If it occurred to anyone to question it, and to ask just why,
if one were actually guilty, one wasn't bound to accuse himself,
the record of that event has not come down to us. Nor had the
redoubtable Dr. Johnson yet developed his famous thesis that no
man can know whether or not he has committed a crime until he
has been officially informed of that fact by the verdict of a jury.
"Nemo tenetur seipsumr prodere," if pronounced with adequate
assurance, has the potency of the very best abacadabra. The incidence of Latin or dog-Latin collocations upon the trends of English law has been marked. Our legal "maxims" are expressed in
Latin; Latin denotes learning and learning radiates authority. If
one declared in Latin that three and four make nine, he would have
made out a good case for that proposition. For example, let us
look at "Caveat emptor." "Caveat emptor" is bound to be good
law, for is it not in Latin? But suppose this maxim had been expressed in plain English, as "Let the buyer beware"; or with less
terseness but with less ambiguity, as, "The buyer who is foolish
enough to trust the sales talk of the seller, does so at his own risk";
might there not have been some doubt as to the morality, not to say
the Christianity, of this maxim? "Caveat emptor" got itself established in English law before "Caveat venditur" (let the seller beware), an equally imposing bt of Latinity, knocked for admittance;
since which time our law reformers have been struggling to inject
some ethics into our law of sales.
If, in the year 1600, a man had dogmatized that "no criminal
is bound to accuse himself," he might well have met the rejoinder,
2. The sentence reads as follows: "Licet nemo tenweur seipsumn prodere
tame proditus per faman, tenet ir seipsum ostendere; utrum posset suam
innocentiam ostendere et seipsum purgare."
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"And why not? Is that not the least amends that the rascal should
3
make ?"
Perhaps the absence of any critical scrutiny of the credentials
of the newcomer was due to the subtle ambiguity of the phrase.
Viewed in its literal nakedness, all that it could have meant was that
no man was bound to volunteer his self-accusation; no man was
bound to come forth to proclaim his own guilt. Thus viewed, the
thing was impeccable. This much is certain; the notion that one
was not bound to answer a question put to him in open court or
before committing magistrates if the answer would tend to incriminate him, would have been regarded as bizarre in Coke's day
and for many years thereafter.
The whole subject of immunity from self-incrimination emerges
from a thick obscurity into which the Blackstones, the Storeys and
the Holmes seem to have been reluctant to penetrate. Warrants of
torture furnish an incongruous commentary upon the antiquity of
some of our boasted immunities. The latest of these warrants to
come down to us is dated 1640.
The fact is clear, however, that at least a qualified immunity
from compulsory self-incrimination did finally lodge in English
and American basic law. Just how did this happen? The classic
account of the matter is by no means lucid or reasonably satisfactory. It may be summarized as follows:
In the early decades of the 17th century, the English system of
judicature presented a curious spectacle. Three courts of common
law competed for business with the Admiralty court and the Court
of Chancery; and all collided at times with the Court of High
Commission and the Court of the Star Chamber. Each of these
courts was striving to expand the boundaries of its jurisdiction, and
jurisdictional disputes were almost as frequent as those between
labor unions today.
The common law courts judged ordinary civil and criminal
cases; of the three, the King's Bench was the chief. The Court of
Chancery exercised a jurisdiction in equity, a branch of law ema3. It should not be forgotten that the doctrine and discipline of the
Church of Rome did not disappear with the primacy of the Pope; the Church
of England continued in the Catholic tradition under the tutelage of the
Crown. Among the institutions of the Church was that of auricular con-

fession. It is true that "sins" were regarded for the purposes of the con-

fessional as offenses against God rather than the State, but it must also
have been true that a great many of the confessed sins were also civil crimes.
From the standpoint of the moral and religious duty of confession, the dis-

tinction between "sins" and "crimes" was indeed finally drawn; at any rate,
the climate of opinion in which the performance of such duty was adjured
could hardly have been accommodating to the doctrine of "Nemo tenetur
seipsum prodere."
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nating from the King's conscience which was supposed to ameliorate
the rigors and correct the injustices of the common law. The Admiralty court was concerned, as its name denotes, with maritime
controversies and with the condemnation of prizes captured in war.
The Court of High Corrunission exercised a supervisory ecclesiastical jurisdiction that was exquisitely solicitous of the eternal
salvation of the souls of all British subjects and of the emoluments
and prerogatives of the Established Church, for the attainment of
which worthy purposes it sought to enforce rigid conformity to the
correct line of theological doctrine. "Deviationism" was anathema
long before the Soviets took it up and gave it a new name. The
Court of Star Chamber meddled with many things both civil and
criminal; the boundaries of its jurisdiction were uncharted. It was
chiefly engaged in enforcing political conformity; that is to say, it
had a very sensitive nose for "treason" to the person of the
Sovereign, sedition, seditious libel, etc. Both courts acted upon information supplied to them by spies and stooges; they arrested
suspects, haled them to their own precincts and there administered
to them what was called the "oath ex officio" as a prelude to an
extended inquisition into their affairs.
The unauthorized administration of this oath "ex officio" is
regarded by some of our lawyers as the starting point of a series
of developments that finally culminated in the principle barring
compulsory self-incrimination. The oath itself was none other than
what is administered in our own courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction every day. It was an oath to tell the truth in answer to the
questions about to be put to the witness. This oath was administered in the common law courts; its administration there evoked
no opposition from any source.
The oath ex officio had once been an oath of compurgation;
that is to say, an oath taken by an ecclesiastic accused of an offense,
or by his friends, who were called his compurgators, by the magic
of which the accused cleric was purged of the criminal charge
against him. Just how the name of this ancient oath came to be attached to the ordinary oath administered to witnesses in civil and
criminal trials is not clear; but it is quite clear that the taking of
this oath before the High Commission or the Star Chamber was
far from purging the suspect: of any charge; on the contrary, it
was the prelude of an inevitable attempt to fasten a charge upon
him. The great objection to the oath, as there administered, was
that it was not administered at a trial but in a proceeding that was
extra-judicial and preliminary to any formal charge. The fact that
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committing magistrates were administering this same oath to persons accused of a felony, seems to have been overlooked by these
objectants; but then, consistency is not brilliantly exemplified in
the story of the development of legal principles.
The case of John Lilburn4 has been utilized to lend vitality to
the theory that opposition to the administration of the oath ex
officio was what started the movement towards the immunity from
self-incrimination. Lilburn was arrested in 1637 by an officer of
the Star Chamber upon information furnished to it that he had sent
certain seditious books from Holland into England. After being
interrogated without oath, the oath ex officio was read to him, but
he refused to take it. He persisted in his refusal for several weeks
and was finally adjudged in contempt of court. He was sentenced to
pay a fine, to be publicly whipped, to be pilloried and then to be
imprisoned until he was ready to take the oath. The sentence was
carried out and he remained in prison until 1641, when he was released by the House of Commons under a resolution which declared "that the sentence of the Star Chamber given against John
Lilburn is illegal and against the liberty of the subject; and also
bloody, cruel, wicked, barbarous and tyrannical."
The matter was then carried to the House of Lords for judgment as to the amount of damages suffered by Lilburn. The Lords
inflicted a heavy fine upon the judges of the Star Chamber.
Now, the point made by Lilburn seems to have been missed by
some of the historians of the law. He did not contend that the administration of the oath ex officio, anywhere or at any time, was
illegal; such a contention would have been absurd. That oath was
administered in all the courts of the kingdom. The essence of his
claim was that while the oath could be administered to a witness
upon a trial,there was no authority to administer it in a proceeding
which was purely exploratory or inquisitional. Lilburn was no
lawyer and his own narrative constitutes the official report of the
case; and it is not surprising that conflicting views are entertained
as to its significance.
There is, however, nothing in his case to support the view that
in the England of 1637, no man could be compelled to give selfincriminating testimony.?
4. 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637-1645).
5. It has been suggested that the denouement of the Lilburne case
furnishes a basis for the contention that in 1641 the common law of England
recognized the immunity of the subject from self-incrimination. Such a con-

tention takes note neither of the text of the Parliamentary resolution nor of
the context of circumstances in which it was generated.

It happens that the Lilburne resolution was one of the early acts of the
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It has also been opined that the origin of the immunity from
compulsory self-incrimination is to be found in the squabbles over
jurisdiction between the common law courts and the High Commission in this matter of administering the oath ex officio. The
common law courts maintained that the ecclesiastical courts were
authorized to entertain only matrimonial cases and cases concerning testaments, and that therefore such courts had no jurisdiction to
conduct inquisitions into the moral practices and religious beliefs
of the laity and to administer the oath ex officio for that purpose.
It is difficult to see what all fais has to do with immunity from selfincrimination. The fact is, that the Court of High Commission did
have authority to administer the oath in matrimonial and probate
cases; that that authority was beyond challenge; and that no witness in a matrimonial case before the High Commission could have
refused to answer a question upon the ground that the answer might
incriminate him. The theory that places the genesis of the constitutional immunity in the quarrels over jurisdiction among the
British courts of the 17th century, attempts a tour de force. Nevertheless it may be as good a theory as any other that is available.
Here history exposes to us another of its serio-farces. At the
very time that the English judges were solemnly proclaiming the
subject's immunity from compulsory self-incrimination, they were
vigorously and with the straightest of faces, subjecting defendants
in criminal cases to all sorts of vexatious and self-incriminating
questions. Had all the thieves in England joined in extolling the
practice of honesty, the situation could not have been more
humorous.
The subsequent development of the immunity from self-incrimination in England is not of concern here. The English colonies on
the North American mainland developed a characteristic, dogmatic
as to basic human rights and constitutional law. The nature of the
Long Parliament under whose aegis two civil wars were conducted; wars
which issued in the decapitation of Charles I, and in the establishment of the
Commonwealth. It was this Parliament which abolished the Courts of High
Commission and of the Star Chamber. The resolution which undertook to
free Lilburne had no judicial quality; it was a political act, intended as a
slap in the face of the King, by way of the excoriation and condemnation of his
agents. It had about the same judicial quality as a Bill of Attainder.
Nor can Lilburne's refusal to take the oath ex officio, be interpreted as a
claim by him of constitutional immunity from self-incrmination. The administration of the oath was often followed by the use of judicial torture for
"the better manifestation of the truth." In any case, it is one thing to claim
that a court had no lawful jurisdiction to administer a certain oath at a given
time, and quite another thing to claim the witness could not be compelled
to answer a question which he claimed might incriminate him. Such a claim
was not made by Lilburne.
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struggle for survival in the North American wilderness cancelled
out many old customs and institutions; and until almost the close
of the 19th century, the American frontier continued to deposit its
libertarian leaven. The concepts of the English common law in the
realm of property rights and the rights of person against person
became part of our own common law; but the rights of the individual vis-a-vis his government underwent a special American
development. It is not to England that we owe the Constitution of
the United States.
The first American documentation upon our theme is to be
found in the "Body of Liberties" adopted in the colony of Massachusetts in 1641. Liberty No. 45 reads as follows:
"No person shall be forced by torture to confess any crime
against himself or any other; unless it be some capital case where
he is first fully convicted by clear and sufficient evidence to be
guilty, after which, if the cause be of that nature that there be
other conspirators or confederates with him that he may be
tortured, yet not with such torture as be barbarous and inhumane."
When the nature of the government that ruled the colony of
Massachusetts in 1641 is contemplated, the notion that these grimvisaged, hard-bitten and incorruptible theocrats would have countenanced the doctrine that a man had a right to refuse to answer a
question claimed by him to be self-incriminating, verges on the
hilarious. The fact is they were somewhat dubious about the reach
of their own "Liberty" No. 45, for Governor Bradford, in 1642,
addressed to a committee of three of his ministers the following
question:
"How farre a magistrate may extracte a confession from a
delinquente to accuse himself of a capital crime seeing 'Nemo
tenetur prodere seipsum'."
Their answers throw a curious light upon the problem posed by the
governor. Two of the ministers held, that if the "delinquente" could
be made to confess by "inquisition" only, it would be lawful, provided that no torture was used; but the third held that torture
could be used where the safety of the state was threatened.
A similar "Liberty" was created in Connecticut. In 1650 its
General Court provided:
"It is ordered by the authority of the court that no man shall be
forced by torture to confess to any crime against himself."
The syntax here is not impeccable, but the meaning is nevertheless clear. You could not apply torture to compel a man to confess to the commission of a crime.

MINNESoTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:75

It is true that almost 150 years were to pass before the 5th
Amendment was to be written, a period long enough to develop a
new religion or a new political dispensation. But it cannot be
gainsaid that these men drew the breath of life from their English
homesteads; and that in their Body of Liberties, they were occupying advanced ground. By our standards, they were hidebound
conservatives; by the standards of their own times they were
liberals in many respects. Their Body of Liberties was intended to
safeguard what they conceived to be fundamental rights. This
hardly included a right to stand mute before a magistrate who
asked a self-incriminating question. The "liberty" they created was
an immunity from the application of torture to educe a compulsory
confession, and not even an unqualified immunity at that.
In the colonies, the development of the principle of immunity
from self-incrimination is exceedingly obscure. Undoubtedly the
lawyers on this side of the Atlantic had studied much of the reported case law; else, Otis could not have thundered against the
Writs of Assistance. When the Revolution got into full swing, the
Continental Congress requested each of the colonies to set up a
state organization, and for that purpose to adopt a state constitution. All of the colonies except Rhode Island adopted a constitution, and some prescribed a Bill of Rights. Some of these embraced a provision to the effect that no person could be compelled
6
to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.
There is singularly little information concerning the authorship
of the constitutional amendments proposed to the First Congress,
ten of whicfi were adopted and submitted to the states for ratification. Upon James Madison devolved the task of putting them
through; and surprisingly enough, he encountered some very determined opposition to some of them. Upon the matter of immunity
6. The provisions were as follows:

Massachusetts: "No subject shall be held to answer for any crime or

offense until the same is fully, plainly, substantially and formally described

to him, or be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself."
Pennsylvania: "That in all prosecutions for criminal offenses, no man...
can be compelled to give evidence against himself."
Delaware: "No man in the courts of common law ought to be compelled to give evidence himself."
Maryland: "That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against
himself in a common court of law or in any other court but in such cases
as have been usually practiced in this state, or may be hereafter directed by
the legislature."
North Carolina: "That in all criminal prosecutions every man... shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself."
None of the other constitutions made any provisions banning compulsory
self-incrimination.
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from compulsory self-incrimination, a very slight record exists.
As originally proposed by Madison, the amendment read:
"No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment,
to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense
nor shall he be compelled to be a witness against himself."
This language followed that of some of the recently adopted
state constitutions. Literally it could have been held to apply to
civil as well as criminal cases; which was precisely the objection
raised by one of the representatives who argued that it contained
"a general declaration in some degree contrary to laws passed."
The reference here was to a statute passed by the First Congress
which enabled a plaintiff to compel a defendant to answer interrogatories by way of a Bill of Discovery. At any rate, the objector contended that the immunity from testifying against oneself should be
confined to criminal cases, and he moved an amendment for that
purpose "which amendment being adopted was unanimously agreed
to."
The significance of this incident seems to have escaped judicial
notice. The amendment to the original proposal makes it clear that
those who drafted it and those who adopted it were concerned solely with the problem of the conduct of a criminal case; they refused
to extend the immunity from compulsory testimony to civil cases. It
would be absurd to gratuitously assume that these skilled lawyers
were unaware of the possibility that a self-incriminating question
might be put to a witness in a civil case; but it is obvious that they
had no intention of immunizing a witness in a civil case.
No published report can be found of a federal judicial decision
concerning self-incrimination from the time of the adoption of the
Bill of Rights down to 1807. In that year Aaron Burr was prosecuted upon a charge of treason in the Federal Circuit Court for the
district of Virginia. John Marshall presided over the proceedings.
Burr's secretary had been questioned by the grand jury concerning the authorship of a certain cipher message attributed by the
prosecution to Burr. He refused to answer upon the ground of selfincrimination. He was thereupon cited for contempt before Marshall; and upon the hearing, the attorneys for Burr supported the
refusal of the witness. After careful deliberation, Marshall handed
down an opinion, which contained the following language:
"It is a well settled maxim of law, that no man is bound to incriminate himself. This maxim forms an exception to the general rule which declares that every person is compellable to bear
testimony in a court of justice . . . if the question be of such

description that an answer to it, may or may not criminate the
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witness, according to the purport of that answer, it must rest
with himself, who alone could tell what it would be, to answer
the question or not. If, in such a case, he say upon his oath, that
his answer would criminate himself, the court can demand no
other testimony of the fact."
This language has been quoted many times by text writers and
judges. There are, however, two aspects of the case that seem to
'have been generally overlooked. One of them is, that despite the
fact that Marshall had said that the court could not overrule the
judgment of the witness as to the incriminating quality of a question, he did overrule this witness and did order him to answer.
The other is, that neither Marshall nor Burr's counsel invoked the
5th Amendment which had been adopted 18 years before. Why not?
The commentators on constitutional law have ignored this aspect of the decision. They have failed to note that when the ablest
interpretor of the Constitution sought to establish the rule of
immunity from compulsory self-incrimination, he called to his support, not the language of the 5th Amendment, with which he must
have been perfectly familiar, but "a well settled maxim of law."
He knew that he who invokes a constitutionalright stands upon a
foundation far firmer than any that can be furnished by a "maxim
of law" however "well settled" it might be. A law regulating the
conduct or the privileges of witnesses, embodied in some "maxim"
could be modified or repealed by Congress overnight. Marshall also
knew that a law abridging a constitutionalright would be void and
of no effect whatever; for he himself had made that momentous
declaration. If Marshall did not cite the 5th Amendment, it must
have been because he did not regardit as applicable.
In three cases in the District Court in Washington, D.C., between 1821 and 1829, witnesses before the grand jury refused to
answer questions upon the ground of self-incrimination. The opinions handed down in these cases furnish no definite formulation of
principle. In the first two cases, the witnesses were compelled to
answer, but not in the third.
It would seem that the first reported federal case in which the
refusal of a witness to answer a self-incriminating question was
based unequivocally upon the language of the 5th Amendment, was
that of United States v. Three Tons of Coal,7 decided in 1875. The
5th Amendment had been adopted 87 years before!
Some coal had been seized by the Treasury Department for
violation of the revenue laws. The seizure was followed by a civil
7. 28 Fed. Cas. 149, No. 16513 (E.D. Wis. 1875).
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action brought by the Government, in which a judgment was sought
legalizing the seizure and directing the confiscation and sale or
destruction of the seized goods.
At that time, a statute was in force under which, in such an
action, the Government could make a motion to compel the owner
of the seized property to produce his papers and books in court for
examination by the Government, to enable it to get evidence in
support of its case.
The motion of the Government for the owner's production of
his books and records, was resisted upon the ground that such an
order would violate the 5th Amendment by compelling the owner
to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. The district court
overruled his objection; it held that an action for the condemnation
of merchandise was not a "criminal case"; that the 5th Amendment
was restricted to criminal cases; and that in a civil case the witness
could be required to answer questions, regardless of whether or
not they were self-incriminating.
The significance of this case is twofold. In the first place, the
question as to whether the constitutional immunity could be
broadened beyond the express language of the 5th Amendment had
been squarely raised and just as squarely met. In the second place,
the old resort to some "well settled principle of law" had been
abandoned as useless by counsel for the defendant; for, if there
ever was such a principle, it had been abrogated by this very Act
of Congress. Henceforth, the immunity would have to be bottomed
on the 5th Amendment; either that, or it simply didn't exist at all.
The modern American doctrine was announced in 1892 by the
Supreme Court in the case of Counselnan v. Hitchcock.8 In that
case, a witness before the grand jury refused to answer certain
questions upon the ground that the answers might incriminate him.
He was convicted of contempt of court, and upon appeal, his conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court.
In its opinion in that case, the Supreme Court pointed out that
the language of the 5th Amendment included not only defendants
in criminal cases but witnesses as well; a "witness" in a criminal
case, could not be compelled to testify against himself. The court
then said, that a grand jury investigation was not only a "case"
but a "criminal case" at that; and that therefore, the appellant was
being compelled by the direction of the district court to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.

S. 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
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It must be obvious that, if up to this point the Court was right,
it need have gone no further. The case presented a situation which
came within the literal language of the 5th Amendment. A witness
in a criminal case was being compelled to be a witness against himself. Such compulsion was in violation of the 5th Amendment. It
was therefore quite unnecessary to the resolution of any issue involved in this case for the Court to go on to say:
"It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness
shall not be compelled in any proceeding, to make disclosure or
give testimony which would tend to criminate him, or to subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures."
This language was not only irrelevant, but self-destructive. It
is one thing to speak of a constitutional mandate, and another, "of
a principle of the law of evidence." If immunity from self-incrimination is merely a principle of the law of evidence, then, whether
that principle be regarded as procedural or substantive, it is subject to alteration, and abolition at the will of Congress. If, on the
other hand, the immunity comes within the coverage of the 5th
Amendment, then it is impregnable; Congress can do nothing to
impair it.
Later, in the case of Twining v. New Jersey,9 the Court modified its views somewhat. It came to the conclusion that the immunity
from self-incrimination was not a part of the common-law heritage
which the colonists brought with them from England; any state
could, if it so chose, refuse to recognize such a right in its own
criminal procedure. So far as it affected the National Government,
the sole basis of the immunity was the langiage of the 5th Amendment. The same question came up in the case of Adamson v. Cal.fornia, ° and the Court there reiterated that position.
The judicial literature on the 5th Amendment and similar
language in state constitutions is extensive but monotonously repetitive. As a general rule, state courts have taken the same position as
that announced by the Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock.
The history of the immunity from self-incrimination has been
traced in order to better judge the logic of its judicial development.
When, in the light of that history, the nature of the evils sought
to be corrected by the 5th Amendment is considered, the conclusion
must be reached that the broad gamut given to the privilege by the
Supreme Court was warranted neither by the actual text of the 5th
Amendment, nor by any apparent purpose of its draftsmen. What
9. 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
10. 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
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had been abhorrent to the British practice was not the self-incrimination, but the nature of the compulsion which had been used in
obtaining it, regardless of its truth or falsity. It was not intended
by the constitutional mandate to prevent the disclosure of the
truth; the purpose was to prevent the ostensible search for the
truth from being perverted, as in the case of the Salem "witch"
confessions, into an instrument of oppression. To prevent such a
consummation, it was declared that, in a "criminal case" a defendant
was not to be subjected to any questioning.
Nor should the incidence of the rule which barred a defendant
in a criminal case from testifying in his own behalf'be ignored,
a rule which was so thoroughly established in the common law
that the possibility of its abrogation was not likely to be contemplated by the draftsmen of the 5th Amendment. The rule against
compulsory self-incrimination would function as a counterweight
to redress the balance of justice. If a man could not take the
witness stand in his own defense, then the most primitive instincts
of justice demanded the abolition of the practice of making him
testify to his own conviction.
It is found that the interpretation put upon the language of the
5th Amendment by the Supreme Court has no historical justification; its ethical and social vindication is even more dubious. Do
the precepts of accepted morality require that a man bear witness
to the crimes of his mother, his brother or his son, but not to those
committed by himself? Is there any social utility in the suppression
of the truth? Is the toll of crime lessened by immunizing the criminal against self-disclosure? Do we maintain courts of justice for the
same uses to which we devote our sports arenas, i.e., for the exhibition of action-dramas played in strict accordance with established
rules? It is true that in the law of evidence there are numerous
rules of exclusion; but these rules are designed for the promotion
of truth, not its suppression. Not all of them accomplish this result, but such as do are not gradually fading into limbo. The day
is not too far distant when any testimony which is relevant,
material and capable of cross-examination will be admissable.
In a civil action, a defendant is no longer shielded from the
compulsion of giving evidence against himself. Such evidence may
result in the deprivation of his home, or of the custody and companionship of his children, or of all his earthly possessions. It may
result in an injury to him far more serious than any jail sentence.
But the public interest no longer permits us to immunize him from
these catastrophies. The shze qua non of all justice is the ascertain-

92

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:75

ment of the truth and of the whole truth; it is becoming clear that
the security of the country against internal as well as external
assault requires that the sanctuary created by the 5th Amendment
be contracted to the proportions designed by those who erected it.1"
11. Lest the charge be made of unwillingness to follow the rigor of my
own logic, my meaning must be further articulated. It is my view that the
doctrine of United States v. Three Tons of Coal, see note 7 supra and text
thereto, must be reverted to. More bluntly, the refusal of a witness to answer
a relevant question put to him before a competent tribunal upon the ground
of self-incrimination, cannot be countenanced unless that question is put to
him in the proceedings of a criminal case. If, instead of discussing constitutional interpretation, constitutional amendment were the subject, I would be
on the side of those who advocate the repeal of the germane portion of the 5th
Amendment. While this may- sound brash and radical, it must be realized how
radically different were the relevant conditions environing the genesis of that
amendment from those of today.

